Casual but Smart: The Court’s new clothes in the Area of Freedom Security and Justice (AFSJ) after the Lisbon Treaty. Research Papers in Law, 2/2008 by Hatzopoulos, Vassilis
 
 
Casual but Smart: 
The Court’s new clothes in the 
Area of Freedom Security and Jus-
tice (AFSJ) after the Lisbon Treaty
Vassilis Hatzopoulos
Research Papers in Law
Cahiers juridiques
No 2 / 2008
www.coleurope.eu
 1 
 
European Legal Studies 
Etudes Européennes Juridiques 
 
 
RESEARCH PAPERS IN LAW 
 
2/2008 
 
Vassilis Hatzopoulos 
 
 Casual but Smart:  
The Court’s new clothes in the Area of Freedom Security and Justice 
(AFSJ) after the Lisbon Treaty 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
© Vassilis Hatzopoulos, 2008 
 
European Legal Studies/Etudes Européennes Juridiques 
Dijver 11 | B-8000 Brugge, Belgium | Tel. +32 (0)50 47 72 61 | Fax +32 (0)50 47 72 60 
E-mail law.info@coleurop.be | www.coleurop.be 
 2 
Casual but Smart: The Court’s new clothes in the Area of Freedom Security 
and Justice (AFSJ) after the Lisbon Treaty 
 
Vassilis Hatzopoulos*
1. Introduction  
 
 
 
Unintended as it was, the European Court of Justice (ECJ, the Court, the Court of the 
EU) has played an extremely important role in the construction of the Area of 
Freedom Security and Justice (AFSJ). The AFSJ was set up by the Treaty of 
Amsterdam in 1997 and only entered into force in May 1999. The fact that this is a 
new field of EU competence, poses afresh all the fundamental questions – both 
political and legal – triggered by European integration, namely in terms of: a) 
distribution of powers between the Union and its Member States, b) attribution of 
competences between the various EU Institutions, c) direct effect and supremacy of 
EU rules, d) scope of competence of the ECJ, and e) extent of the protection given to 
fundamental rights. The above questions have prompted judicial solutions which take 
into account both the extremely sensible fields of law upon which the AFSJ is 
anchored, and the EU’s highly inconvenient three-pillar institutional framework.1
The ECJ is the body whose institutional role is to benefit most from this upcoming 
‘depilarisation’, possibly more than that of the European Parliament.
 This 
structure is on the verge of being abandoned, provided the Treaty of Lisbon enters 
into force.  
2
 
 However 
spectacular this formal boost of the Court’s competence, the changes in real terms 
are not going to be that dramatic. This apparent contradiction is explained, to a large 
extent, by the fact that the Court has in many ways ‘provoked’, or even ‘anticipated’, 
the depilarisation of its own jurisdictional role, already under the existing three-pillar 
structure.  
Simply put, under the new – post Treaty of Lisbon – regime, the Court will have full 
jurisdiction over all AFSJ matters, as those are going to be fully integrated in what is 
now the first pillar. Some limitations will continue to apply, however, while a special 
AFSJ procedure will be institutionalised. Indeed, if we look into the new Treaty we 
may identify general modifications to the Court’s structure and jurisdiction affecting 
the AFSJ (section 2), modifications in the field of the AFSJ stemming from the 
abolition of the pillar structure (section 3) and, finally, some rules specifically 
applicable to the AFSJ (section 4). 
2. General modifications to the Court’s jurisdiction, affecting the AFSJ 
 
The Lisbon Treaty, compared to previous EC/EU Treaties, innovates as to its own 
structure. It consists of three parts, all having equal legal value: a) the very brief 
Treaty of European Union (TEU) introduces the basic structure and principles of the 
                                                        
* Assistant Professor at the Democritus University of Thrace (Greece), Visiting Professor at 
the College of Europe, Bruges (Belgium), Special Lecturer at the University of Nottingham 
(UK), Attorney-at-Law, Member of the Athens Bar. This article is part of the SECURINT 
project and is going to appear in an edited volume, by Jorg Monar, to be published by Peter 
Lang/The College of Europe. Draft text, not to be quoted. Peer review welcome at 
vasshatz@socadm.duth.gr. 
1 For a systematic account of the Court’s case law in this field see V Hatzopoulos ‘With or 
Without You … Judging Politically in the AFSJ’ 33 ELRev (2008) 44-65; see also H. Labayle 
‘Architecte ou spectatrice? La Cour de Justice de l'Union dans l'Espace de liberté, sécurité et 
justice’, 42 RTDEur (2006) 1. 
2 For a general assessment of the jurisdictional role of the Court after the entry into force of 
the Lisbon Treaty see F. de Witte ‘The European Judiciary after Lisbon’ 15 Maastricht Journal 
of European and Comparative Law (2008) 43-54. 
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EU, b) the more extensive and technical Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union (TFEU) describes in detail the various policies and functions of the EU and c) 
the long series of protocols further detail several issues. The Court’s jurisdiction is 
dealt with in all three parts of the new Treaty. 
 
2.1. The Court’s tripartite constitution  
 
The most visible modification introduced by the Lisbon Treaty concerns the very 
structure of the Court, now renamed ‘Court of Justice of the European Union’ 
(CJEU).3
First, the division between the Court of First Instance (CFI) – renamed ‘General 
Court’ and the (higher) ‘Court of Justice’ – is being reinforced. True to its new name, 
the General Court, is to become the main jurisdictional body of the EU, hearing at 
first instance all actions, but preliminary rulings and infringement proceedings against 
Member States (Article 256(1) TFEU). Hence, annulment proceedings between the 
Institutions, which have been quite common in the field of AFSJ,
 Changes in this respect are twofold.  
4 would no longer be 
heard by the Court, but on appeal. Compared to individual actions (which already are 
in the jurisdiction of the CFI), annulment proceedings between the Institutions are 
more likely to bear on important institutional questions. Therefore, the more detailed 
and rigorously reasoned judgments of the General Court – occasionally reviewed by 
the Court of Justice – would be likely to increase visibility and to better the 
understanding of the issues raised by the AFSJ. All the above, however, is put into a 
provisory halt by Article 51 of Protocol n. 3 ‘on the Statute of the CJEU’ which creates 
a very important derogation to the general rule of Article 256(1) TFEU. In the Statute 
it is made clear that annulment actions and actions for failure to act brought by the 
Member States or by the Institutions against the Parliament, the Council and the 
Commission, remain under the exclusive jurisdiction of the CJEU. Therefore, until 
such time as the European Parliament and the Council modify Article 51 of the 
Court’s Statute,5 the above apparent change in the Court’s jurisdiction is only 
forthcoming and hypothetical. The General Court, nonetheless, will be hearing 
annulment (and failure to act) proceedings against the newly recognised defendants: 
the European Council and the Agencies and Bodies of the EU.6
Second, Article 257 TFEU provides that Specialised Courts may be attached to the 
General Court, according to the ordinary legislative procedure. This may prove highly 
relevant for the AFSJ, for at least four reasons. Firstly, individuals are being 
recognised a standing for annulment and failure to act proceedings, both for asylum 
and immigration issues (current Title IV EC) and for police and judicial cooperation 
issues (current Title VI EU).
 
7  Moreover, admissibility conditions of such standing are 
being extended.8
                                                        
3 See Art 19 EU, Arts 251-281 TFEU and protocol n 3. 
4 See e.g. Case C-170/96 Commission  v Council, air transit visas [1998] ECR I-2763; Case 
C-160/03 Spain v Eurojust [2005] ECR I-981; Case C-257/01 Commission v Council, visa 
policy [2005] ECR I-345; Case C-176/03 Commission v Council, sanctions for the 
environment, [2005] ECR I-7879; Joined Cases C-317 & 318/04 European Parliament v 
Council, PNR [2006] ECR I-4721; Case C-540/03 EP v Council, Family reunification [2006] 
ECR I-5769; Case C-77/05, Commission v Council, sanctions for the environment, judgment 
of 23 October 2007, nyr; Case C-133/06 Parliament v Council, asylum procedures directive, 
judgment of May 6, 2008, nyr. 
5 Such a modification may be adopted according to the ordinary legislative procedure, 
following a proposal by the Court or the Commission and in consultation with the other body; 
see Art 281 TFEU. 
6 See below 2.2.1. 
7 See below 3.2. 
8 See below 2.2.2. 
 Secondly, the preliminary competence of the Court is being 
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generalised and extended to all jurisdictions of all Member States.9 Therefore, an 
important increase of AFSJ cases reaching the docket of the CJEU is to be 
expected.10 Thirdly, an urgency procedure is provided specifically for AFSJ cases, 
where a person in custody is involved.11 Fourthly, it has been forcefully been put 
forward that judging in the field of AFSJ, especially in cases involving criminal law, 
requires special expertise, which the judges of the General Court and the Court of 
Justice may  be lacking.12
 
 These four factors together may, if overload does in fact 
materialise, eventually lead to the creation of a specialised AFSJ Court. 
2.2. Expanded admissibility in annulment proceedings  
 
2.2.1. Passive legitimation: new Institutions subject to the Court’s control 
 
Article 263 TFEU, provides that the Court ‘shall also review the legality of acts of 
bodies, offices or agencies of the Union intended to produce legal effects vis-à-vis 
third parties’. Similarly, Article 265 TFEU provides for failure to act proceedings 
against such bodies. Both provisions use a wide formulation which includes all acts 
and, presumably also, all kinds of bodies, no matter their legal status. The only 
limitation introduced by the new provision is that of the intent of the author of the act. 
Therefore, jurisdictional immunity is no longer afforded to players actively 
participating in shaping and/or implementing EU policies. Two categories of new 
litigants are especially relevant for the AFSJ.  
Firstly, the European Council: this body started up as an informal and purely 
intergovernmental forum for the exchange of political views as far back as 1969. It 
got formally institutionalised by the 1992 Treaty of Maastricht as the only new 
Institution pertaining to the EU – as opposed to the pre-existing EC Institutions. Since 
its institutionalisation, the European Council has fully dominated cooperation in the 
second pillar (common foreign and security policy). It has also played an extremely 
important role in the third pillar (immigration etc / justice and home affairs) even after 
its partial ‘communautarisation’ by the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty. This boost of the 
European Council’s role in the field of the AFSJ is not only symptomatic of the 
general trend towards intergovernmentalism13 and the hyper-activity of the European 
leaders (the European Council was meant to meet twice – or more – every year, but 
in fact it has been meeting an average of 6-8 times). It is also, and to a large extent, 
due to the fact that the Treaty provisions on the AFSJ only provide powers for the EC 
(Title IV EC) and the EU (Title VI EU), but not the ends to which such powers should 
be used. This gap has been filled up by the European Council’s meeting in special 
sessions, most importantly in Tampere (1999) and the Hague (2004).14
                                                        
9 See below 3.1. 
10 For a thorough discussion of the additional charge of the Court arising from AFSJ cases 
see House of Lords (EU Committee), 10th Report 2007-08, The Treaty of Lisbon: an Impact 
Assessment, vol. 1, 127 et seq.  
11 See below 4.2. 
 Therefore, 
the European Council has been playing a ‘semi-constituant’ role in the field of AFSJ. 
The role of the most supranational body has been further strengthened by the fact 
12 See House of Lords 10th Report, above fn 10, 129 et seq.  
13 See recently S Blavoukos, D Bourantonis and G Pagoulatos, ‘A President for the European 
Union: A New Actor in Town?’, 45/2 JCMS  (2007) 231-252, 237. 
14 This point is clearly being made by Ph De Bruycker, ‘L’émergence d’une politique 
européenne d’immigration’, in « The emergence of a European immigration policy – 
L’émergence d’une politique européenne d’immigration », Ph De Bruycker, Academic 
Network for Legal Studies on Immigration and Asylum Law in Europe, Réseau académique 
Odysseus, Bruylant 2003, 1-95. 
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that until the end of 2004 the Council of Ministers has been deciding alone (or merely 
in consultation with the Parliament under the EC Treaty), based on unanimity. Only in 
December 2004 did the Council switch to the co-decision procedure and this only in 
respect of the less contentious matters of visas, asylum and illegal (as opposed to 
legal) immigration.15 Under the Lisbon Treaty co-decision and qualified majority in the 
Council will become the standard decision making procedure, while the Treaty itself 
will contain some general aims to be achieved in the AFSJ. The projected President 
of the European Council, however, is expected to strengthen the role of this 
Institution.16
Secondly, the AFSJ is one of the fields in which new EU Agencies develop and 
flourish.
 
17 Europol, Eurojust, CEPOL (College of European Police), EBA (European 
Border Agency), FRA (Fundamental Rights Agency) are only some of the Agencies 
involved in the management of the AFSJ.18 These Agencies do not, in principle, 
issue binding acts. Therefore, their action is only subject to some kind of ‘principal – 
agent’ supervision by the Institution to which they are attached (i.e. the Commission 
or Council)19, as well as to indirect control by the European Parliament and the 
Ombudsman. It is not, however, subject to judicial review. Moreover, the ‘acts’ they 
issue do not fall within the typology of those currently provided for in Articles 230 EC 
(first pillar) or 35(7) EU (third pillar), which the ECJ does have competence to review. 
This has led the Court to hold that, unless otherwise provided in their founding acts, 
no annulment proceedings lie against the acts of such Agencies.20 This finding, 
grounded on a narrow reading of the ‘rule of law’ principle, creates an uncomfortable 
situation, since the Agencies play an ever increasing role in the administration and 
every day running of the AFSJ. Moreover, the Court’s findings in Spain v. Eurojust 
seems indirectly infirmed by the more recent judgments in Gestoras and Segi,21
                                                        
15 See Council Decision 2004/927/EC of the Council of 22 December 2004 [2004] OJ L 
396/45. For the scope of this decision see Case C-133/06 Parliament v Council, asylum 
procedures directive, nyr, delivered on May 6, 2008. 
 
where the Court opted for a much wider application of the ‘rule of law’ principle.  
16 See Blavoukos e.a. above fn 13. 
17 In general for Agencies see E. Chiti, ‘The Emergence of a Community Administration: the 
Case of European Agencies’ (2000) CMLRev 309-343, E. Vos, ‘Reforming the European 
Commission: What Role to Play for EU Agencies?’ (2000) CMLRev 1113-1134, X. 
Yataganas, ‘Delegation of Regulatory Authority in the EU, The Relevance of the American 
Model of Independent Agencies’ (03/01) Jean Monnet Paper, G. Majone, ‘Delegation of 
regulatory powers in a mixed polity’ (2002) ELJ 319-339, P. Craig, ‘The constitutionalisation of 
Community administration’ (2003) ELRev 840-864, M. Flinders, ‘Distributed public 
governance in the EU’ (2004) JEPP 520-544,  D. Geradin & N. Petit, ‘The development of 
Agencies at EU and national levels: Conceptual analysis and proposals for reform’ (2004) 23 
YEL,  137-197; see also the Commission communication COM (2002) 718 final. 
18 For the acts instituting these agencies see the Europol Convention of 26 July 1995 [1995] 
OJ C 316/; Decision 2002/187/JHA [2002] L 63/1; Decision 2005/685/JHA [2005] OJ L 
256/63; Regulation (EC) 2007/2004 [2004] OJ L 349/1; Regulation (EC) 168/2007 [2007] OJ L 
53/1, respectively.   
19 With few exceptions, supervision is essentially indirect and operates mainly through a) the 
nomination/revocation of members and/or of the board of managers and/or of the Director of 
the Agencies, b) control over their financial resources and their use, c) a yearly report 
submitted to the supervising Institution and (more often than not) to the European Parliament. 
20 Case C-160/03 Spain v Eurojust, [2005] ECR I-2077. The question arose as to whether the 
terms and conditions (concerning the linguistic qualifications of the participants) for the 
selection of personnel for Eurojust could be challenged by a Member State (i.e. a privileged 
applicant). The Court answered in the negative. It maintained that the rule of law is sufficiently 
protected by both the individual right of participants to challenge the terms of the selection 
procedure before the CFI, and the right of Member States to intervene in the proceedings.  
21 For which see the analysis below 2.2.2. 
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Next to the Agencies, there are also several other ‘bodies’ or ‘offices’ involved in the 
design and management of the AFSJ. The High Level Group on Asylum and 
Migration (created in 1998) is hierarchically the most important, but one should not 
forget the SCIFA (Strategic Committee on Immigration, Frontiers and Asylum) and 
the SCIFA +, the CIREFI (Centre d’Information de Réflexion et d’Echange sur les 
Frontières et l’Immigration), the EURASIL, the European Migration Network, the 
Immigration Liaison Officers Network, to state just a few. These bodies play 
essentially consultative and/or preparatory role and therefore their ‘acts’ are unlikely 
to ‘produce legal effects vis-à-vis third parties’, in the sense of Article 263 TFEU. It 
may not be altogether excluded, however, that a ‘strategic plan’ adopted by the High 
Level Group affects individual rights through some ‘return policy’, nor that some of 
the other body’s activities impairs the status of some ‘third party’.  
Last but not least, the broad way in which Article 263 TFEU is drafted, seems to be 
encompassing also Funds. It should be remembered that an important series of 
Funds is already active in the AFSJ: the European Refugee Fund, the External 
Borders Fund, the Return Fund, the Integration Fund.22
 
 Their acts could be 
challenged in the future, essentially by the privileged plaintiffs (i.e. the Member 
States, the Council and the European Parliament), probably as a way to controlling 
their functioning. 
2.2.2. Active legitimation: individual plaintiffs admitted more extensively 
 
Article 263 TFEU introduces yet another considerable extension of the Court’s 
competence for annulment proceedings. The standing of individual plaintiffs is 
formally extended to cover not only acts ‘addressed to that person or which [are] of 
direct and individual concern to them’ but also against ‘a regulatory act which is of 
direct concern to [them]’ provided it does not entail any implementing measures. This 
replaces the current much more restrictive formula (Article 230 EC), whereby 
individual plaintiffs may only oppose decisions addressed to them or regulations and 
decisions addressed to other persons, provided they are of direct and individual 
concern to the plaintiffs. The fact that annulment proceedings may be brought not 
only against formal decisions but against any act affecting individual rights, 
irrespective of its formal qualification, is no novelty and corresponds to longstanding 
case law of the Court.23
Of more interest is the fact that individual concern is being dropped as a prerequisite 
for the admissibility of individual annulment proceedings against regulatory acts.
  
24 In 
this respect the Court’s case law has ebbed and flowed.25 It is, however, in the recent 
terrorist cases, borderlining between the AFSJ and the CFSP (Common Foreign and 
Security Policy) that the Court has uncovered the lengths to which it is ready to go in 
order to ensure that acts affecting individual rights do not evade judicial control. In 
Gestoras pro Amnestia and Segi,26
                                                        
22 Décision 573/2007/EC, OJ [2007] L 144/1, Decision 574/2007/EC, OJ [2007] L 144/22, 
Decision 575/2007/EC, OJ [2007] L 144/45, Decision 435/2007/EC, OJ [2007] L 168/18, 
respectively. 
23 See Case 22/70 Commission v Council, ERTA [1971] ECR 263 and, more recently, Case 
C-57/95 France v Commission, Pension Funds Communication [1997] ECR I-1627. 
24 New problems are expected to arise out of this provision of the Lisbon Treaty, as no 
definition is given in the Treaty of what constitutes ‘a regulatory act’. 
25 The last episode in the Court’s jurisprudence is the remarkable judgment in Case C-50/00 
P Union de Pequenos Agricultores [2002] ECR I-6677. 
26 Case C-354/04 P Gestoras pro Amnestia and Case C-355/04 P, Segi, both delivered on 
February 27, 2007; for these two cases see E. Meisse in (4/2007) Europe comm. 110, p. 24-
25. 
 the President of the CFI had declared 
inadmissible an action in damages against the EC Institutions for having placed 
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some individuals and organizations on the list of presumed terrorists. The Court, 
confirming on this point the CFI, started by recognising that the system of judicial 
protection foreseen by the Treaty for the third pillar is incomplete compared to that of 
the first pillar and that no action in damages lies outside the latter.27
‘It follows that the institutions are subject to review of the conformity of their acts with 
the treaties and the general principles of law, just like the Member States when they 
implement the law of the Union’.
  It went on, 
however, to hold that by virtue of Article 6 EU the Union is based on the rule of law 
and the respect of fundamental rights.  
28
In consequence, the Court found that all acts (under all pillars) which have the effect 
of directly affecting individual rights may be brought before the ECJ by way of a 
preliminary question, even if this is not expressly provided for in the relevant Treaty 
provision. They may also be challenged by the privileged applicants (EC Institutions 
and Member States) in accordance with Article 35(6) EU.
 
29
‘it is for the Member States and, in particular, their courts and tribunals, to interpret 
and apply national procedural rules governing the exercise of rights of action in a way 
that enables natural and legal persons to challenge before the courts the lawfulness 
of any decision or other national measure relating to the drawing up of an act of the 
European Union or to its application to them’.
 And since individual 
plaintiffs are not eligible to bring annulment actions against acts of the second or third 
pillar,  
30
Therefore, based on the rule of law approach, the Court partly reviewed the 
procedural arrangements of the Treaty,
 
31 in order to ensure that any act producing 
legal effects is subject to a) judicial review and b) its own preliminary jurisdiction. In 
this way the Court, at a time when the content of the Lisbon (then named Reform) 
Treaty was being actively negotiated under the auspices of the German Presidency, 
sent a clear message highlighting the gaps of legal protection existing in the current 
institutional constellation and pushed for extending individual plaintiffs’ rights.32 This 
has also led to the introduction, in the Lisbon Treaty, of Article 275 TFEU, whereby 
by derogation to the general rule that CFSP measures are immune to the Court’s 
jurisdiction, the Court will have competence to review ‘the legality of European 
decisions providing for restrictive measures against natural or legal persons adopted 
by the Council’.33
 
  
2.3. Enhanced infringement proceedings 
 
Compliance with EU law is also addressed by the Lisbon Treaty. In particular, 
Commission infringement proceedings against Member States are facilitated in two 
ways, aiming at putting pressure onto recalcitrant States through the accelerated 
imposition of fines.  
                                                        
27 Gestoras pro Amnestia, para. 50. 
28 Ibid, para. 51; and more recently Case C-303/05 Advocaten voor de Wereld, judgment of 
May 3, 2007, para 45. 
29 Ibid, para. 55. 
30 Ibid, para. 56. In this respect this judgment operates a clear reversal of the Orders of the 
CFI, where it was maintained that individuals have no remedy against a common position, 
either under EU or under national law. The same restrictive solution has also been adopted 
by the French Conseil d’Etat, in its judgment in case Dispans c/ Mininstre de l’Intérieur, 11-12-
06, AJDA 2007, p. 421; for this French case see D. Simon in (4/2007) Europe, comm. 108, p. 
23. 
31 Concerning generally the role of the rule of law in the AFSJ see also C Dauvergne 
‘Sovereignty, Migration and the Rule of Law in Global Times’ 67 MLR (2004) 588-615. 
32 See on this aspect of the ECJ’s case law, Hatzopoulos above fn 1, 47-50. 
33 Further on that see below 4.3. 
 8 
Therefore, recidivist States, who insist on not complying with a (first) judgment of the 
Court, may be brought before the Court for a second time without a fresh reasoned 
opinion being served to them (compare Article 260(2) TFEU with Article 228(2) EC).  
More importantly, where a Member State is pursued by the Commission for the non 
transposition of a Directive (i.e. a straight forward and easily ascertainable 
infringement), then the latter may require the imposition of fines, already in the first 
proceedings brought before the Court.34
 
 
3. Specific AFSJ modifications to the Court’s jurisdiction linked to the 
‘depilarisation’ 
 
3.1. Generalisation of preliminary rulings 
 
The single most important consequence, in terms of the Court’s jurisdiction, 
stemming from the abolition of the three-pillar structure, is the generalisation of the 
Court’s preliminary jurisdiction. As things stand today there is a double limitation in 
the way the Article 234 EC procedure applies in the field of the AFSJ. In the first pillar 
(Article 68(1) EC), preliminary questions are only open to jurisdictions ‘against whose 
decisions there is no judicial remedy’, not to all jurisdictions.35 Worse still, in the third 
pillar, Article 35 EU, provides for a twofold limitation. First, Member States are not 
subject to the preliminary jurisdiction of the Court unless they have made a 
declaration to that effect. To date, sixteen Member States have made such a 
declaration.36
These differences, however, have been considerably ‘played down’ by the Court. The 
judgment of the Court in Pupino
 Second, Article 35 EU –contrary to Article 234 EC or even 68 EC – 
only provides for the interpretation by the Court, of secondary legislation and not of 
the Treaty provisions themselves.  
37
                                                        
34 This new possibility is criticised by part of the doctrine (see e.g. S. Peers in the House of 
Lords Report, quoted above fn 
 was delivered in preliminary proceedings initiated 
by an Italian jurisdiction, under Article 35 EU, in relation to a framework decision in 
the field of criminal law. Before answering the substantive issues raised by the 
referring jurisdiction, the ECJ had to reject some admissibility claims put froward by 
some of the intervening Member States. In doing so, the Court made it clear that the 
preliminary procedure provided for by Article 35 EU is governed by the same 
interpretative rules (concerning the qualification of the referring body as a ‘court’, the 
clarity and necessity of the question referred to the Court etc), as that of Article 234 
10, ); our guess is that this possibility will be useful as a 
means to exert pressure to Member States, but will be used by the Commission only in the 
most flagrant violations. 
35 For a very critical account of this Treaty provision see C. Cheneviere, ‘L’article 68 CE – 
Rapide survol d’un renvoi préjudiciel mal compris’ (2004) CDE 567-589. See also the 
Commission communication COM (2006) 346 final, of June 28th 2006, where it proposes that 
Article 234 EC should also become plainly applicable in the field of Asylum, Immigration and 
Visas.  
36 According to Art. 35 EU Member States are free to make a declaration as to whether they 
accept the Court’s preliminary jurisdiction and, in the case that they do, whether all  - or only 
higher - jurisdictions should have access to the Court. It is remarkable that out of sixteen 
Member States who have submitted declarations, only two have limited the access of their 
tribunals to the ECJ. The remaining fourteen include countries such as: Austria, the Benelux 
countries, the Czech Republic, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, and Italy. It is also worth 
noting that there is no official document enumerating Member States which have submitted a 
declaration and that the number of declarations informally brought to the attention of the 
present author differs from the one the British House of Lords refers to in its Report, quoted 
above, fn 10, 125, where it is stated that fourteen Member States have made declarations. 
37 Case C-105/03 Pupino, judgment of May 31, 2005. 
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EC. 38 The same tendency was also pursued in the more recent judgment of the 
Court in Gestoras pro Amnestia, with the effect of furthering the parallelism between 
the first and the third pillars.39
The second difference identified above, concerning the Court’s (lack of) jurisdiction to 
interpret the Treaty provisions of the third pillar, has been addressed by the Court in 
the recent judgment in Advocaten voor de Wereld.
  
40 In a judgment delivered by the 
Grand Chamber, with the intervention of no less than ten Member States (the 
conclusions of which were, for once, followed by the Court) the Court upheld the 
validity of the Council’s framework decision which established the European arrest 
warrant.41 A Belgian NGO contested before the Belgian courts the legality of the law 
which transposed into national law the aforementioned framework decision. One of 
the intervening states in the proceedings before the Court deemed the preliminary 
question inadmissible in that it (indirectly) required the Court ‘to examine Article 
34(2)(b) EU, which is a provision of primary law not reviewable by the Court’.42
‘Under Article 35(1) EU, the Court has jurisdiction […] to give preliminary rulings on 
the interpretation and validity of, inter alia, framework decisions, which necessarily 
implies that it can, even if there is no express power to that effect, be called upon to 
interpret provisions of primary law […] where […] the Court is being asked to 
examine whether a framework decision has been properly adopted on the basis of 
that latter provision.’
 The 
Court remained unconvinced by this argument, as well as by the stark difference of 
wording of the above-mentioned Treaty provisions. It held that: 
43
Therefore, the Court has reshaped its preliminary competence in the third pillar in 
parallel with that of the first. Not only has it extended its jurisdiction to all acts of 
secondary legislation (see Gestoras pro Amnestia in relation to common positions),
 
44
Article 267 TFEU now provides for a single preliminary procedure covering all issues 
of the current first and third pillar. This is compulsory for all Member States and for all 
jurisdictions and does not require any prior declaration or other formality. Further, 
both primary and secondary law may be subject to the Court’s interpretation. A 
special fast-track procedure is provided for in the last paragraph of Article 267, for 
cases stemming from the AFSJ, where ‘a person in custody’ is involved.
 
but it has also interpreted the Treaty provisions themselves, of a Treaty deemed 
‘intergovernmental’ (see Advocaten voor de Wereld). 
45
 
 As a 
consequence of the above ‘generalisation’ of the Court’s preliminary jurisdiction, the 
special competence of the Court (provided for in Article 68(3)) to give interpretative 
judgments on the request of the Council, the Commission or any Member State is 
being dropped. 
3.2. Regular plaintiffs admitted to introduce annulment proceedings  
 
                                                        
38 According to Art. 35 EU Member States are free to make a declaration as to whether they 
accept the Court’s preliminary jurisdiction and, in the case that they do, whether all  - or only 
higher - jurisdictions should have direct access to the Court. It is remarkable that out of 
sixteen Member States who have submitted declarations, only two have limited the access of 
their tribunals to the ECJ. The remaining fourteen include countries such as: Austria, the 
Benelux countries, the Czech Republic, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, and Italy. 
39 See above fn 26. 
40 Above fn 28. 
41 Framework decision 2002/584/JHA of 13 June 2002 [2002] OJ L 190/1. 
42 Advocaten voor de Wereld para 17. 
43 Ibid para 18. 
44 Above fn 26. 
45 For which see below 4.2. 
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A second important change in the Court’s jurisdiction, already mentioned, relates to 
annulment proceedings. It has already been explained that passive legitimation has 
been extended to cover the European Council and the Agencies, bodies etc. It has 
also been said that individual plaintiffs are more largely admitted to introduce 
annulment proceedings, as an individual concern is no more required where a 
regulatory act requiring no transposition is at stake. These are important changes for 
both the matters currently falling under the first and under the third pillar. However, 
for third pillar issues ‘depilarisation’ makes the change all the more important.  
This is so because, as it now stands, Article 35(6) EU provides only for annulment 
proceedings to be brought by a Member State or the Commission. In other words, 
only privileged plaintiffs – and then again not all – can initiate annulment 
proceedings. The fact that no annulment proceedings lie for individuals has been 
highlighted – and indeed stigmatised – by the Court itself in its judgment in Gestoras 
pro Amnistia and Segi.46
The abolition of the pillars by the Lisbon Treaty will, for the first time, make it possible 
for individual plaintiffs – and privileged plaintiffs other than the Member States and 
the Commission – to bring annulment proceedings in the field of criminal justice and 
judicial and police cooperation. Indeed, the indirect and imperfect way devised by the 
Court to comply with the ‘rule of law’ principle (above) should only be seen as an 
‘interim’ solution, on the way to some more acceptable institutional setting. Already 
under the current indirect fertilisation of the EU by the grand ECHR principles and the 
oblique control the ECtHR exerts over the functioning of the EU,
 It is true that in these judgments the Court did find a way to 
secure the ‘rule of law’ principle. This, nonetheless, was both indirect and imperfect. 
Indirect, because it was through the intermediation of Member States that the Court 
sought to guarantee that individuals have rights of action. Indeed, the Court held that 
Article 6 EU obliges Member States, when implementing EU law, to ‘interpret and 
apply national procedural rules governing the exercise of rights of action in a way that 
enables natural and legal persons to challenge before the courts the lawfulness of 
any decision or other national measure’. Imperfect because, while opening up their 
dockets to European AFSJ cases, the national jurisdictions are supposed – 
according to the Court – to have access to the preliminary assistance of the Court. 
This, however, ignores the fact that only sixteen Member States have made 
declarations under Article 35(2) and that plaintiffs in national proceedings can never 
force their way to Luxembourg. 
47
 
 it is unclear 
whether the Court’s judgments in Segi and Gestoras pro Amnistia would satisfy 
Article 6 ECHR. After the full accession of the EU to ECHR, provided for in the 
Lisbon Treaty, the opening up of ‘third pillar’ annulment proceedings to individual 
plaintiffs seems a one way road. 
3.3. Infringement proceedings against Member States  
 
Further to the extension of individual rights vis-à-vis the Institutions, the 
‘depilarisation’ also strengthens the role of the Commission, not only as an initiator of 
EU legislation, but also as a watchdog for the proper application of such legislation. 
Under the current intergovernmental setting of the third pillar, the Commission may 
not bring infringement proceedings against Member States. Only other Member 
States can do so, provided however, that ‘such dispute cannot be settled by the 
Council within six months of its being referred to the Council by one of its members’ 
(Article 35(7) EU). Existing solidarity between non-compliant peers, combined to the 
                                                        
46 See eg Gestoras pro Amnestia, para. 50. 
47 See ECtHR judgment in Bosphorus International, application n. 45036/98, judgement 
delivered on 30 June 2005. See annotation by Douglas-Scott in CMLRev (2006), 243-254. 
See also, by the same author ‘A Tale of Two Courts; Luxembourg, Strasbourg and the 
Growing European Human Rights Acquis’ CMLRev (2006) 629-665. 
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six month political interlude, have led to the de facto idleness of judicial enforcement 
in the third pillar.  
This is going to change under the Lisbon Treaty since the Commission will recover its 
traditional enforcement role. In this respect the new, enhanced, powers of the 
Commission concerning infringement proceedings,48
 
 will be of utmost importance. By 
the same token, compliance in the field the AFSJ will be de-politicised, since 
negotiations in the Council will bear only on prospective legislation and will not be 
diluted by compliance issues. Indeed, the position of Member States in the field of 
AFSJ – in particular what is today the third pillar – will be fundamentally altered: from 
a situation where each Member State can negotiate around its veto and may, in 
impunity, indefinitively resist the application of EU rules it dislikes, States will now 
have to decide with qualified majority and be subject to strict compliance scrutiny by 
the Commission. This swift departure from intergovernmentalism may be a partial 
explanation for the ‘emergency brake’ procedures provided for by Articles 82(2), 
83(3) (judicial cooperation in criminal matters), 86 (European Public Prosecutor) and 
87 (police cooperation). The precise mechanisms of the ‘emergency brakes’ differ 
from area to area, but the basic idea is that any Member State which considers that a 
proposed legislative text affects fundamental aspects of its judicial system can refer 
the matter to the European Council and have the ordinary legislative procedure 
suspended. Such suspension may go on until such time as divergences are settled at 
the political level, or at least nine Member States decide to proceed with enhanced 
cooperation. 
3.4. Action in damages against the EU 
 
A further consequence of the depilarisation is that, henceforth, individual plaintiffs will 
have the right to claim damages for EU action in the field of police and judicial 
cooperation. The non-existence of such a claim under the current setting has been 
stigmatised by the Court in the Gestoras and Segi cases.49
 This newly acquired jurisdiction of the Court, however, is expected to be of limited 
importance for, at least, two reasons. First, future cases similar to Gestoras and Segi 
may not be successfully pleaded in the framework of a claim for damages. According 
to the Court’s longstanding case law a claim in damages is inadmissible where an 
annulment action could have the very same practical effects for the claimant. In other 
words, damage suffered because of an act imposing some kind of fine, freezing of 
funds or other pecuniary sanction, can only be remedied by the annulment of such 
act, but not through an action for damages.
 
50
The ‘passive legitimation’ of Agencies, bodies etc,
 Second, damages claims in a field 
where the EU decision making is characterised by the exercise of important 
discretion and by restricted disclosure of relevant information and documents, will be 
very difficult to substantiate.  
51
 
 however, some of which may 
also develop operational activities (EUROPOL, EBA), may be a source of important 
damages claims. 
4. Rules specifically applicable in the AFSJ 
 
Despite the ‘depilarisation’ pursued by the Lisbon Treaty and the fusion of the first 
with the third pillar, some specific rules concerning the Court’s jurisdiction are to be 
found in the new Treaty.  
                                                        
48 See above 2.3. 
49 See above fn 26 and the corresponding text.   
50 Case 25/62 Plaumann [1963] ECR 201: a different solution would indirectly side-step the 
two-month time-limitation for introducing annulment proceedings. 
51 For which see above 2.2.1. 
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4.1. Public order derogation 
 
Article 276 TFEU provides that  
‘in exercising its powers […] relating to the AFSJ the CJEU shall have no jurisdiction 
to review the validity or proportionality of operations carried out by the police or other 
law-enforcement services of a Member State or the exercise of the responsibilities 
incumbent upon Member States with regard to the maintenance of law and order and 
the safeguarding of internal security.’  
This provision is directly issued from Article 35(5) EU as it now stands. It also finds its 
equivalent in the first pillar in current Article 68(2) EC. It is true that the latter (EC) 
provision seems to be limiting solely to the preliminary competence of the ECJ, while 
the former (EU) provision clearly introduces a general reserve to the Court’s 
jurisdiction.  
It remains that none of these provisions have ever been applied up till now, so only 
speculations may be made concerning the way in which they may be construed and 
applied in the future. Four ideas may, nevertheless, be put forward in this respect. 
First, the general ‘mainstreaming’ of the AFSJ into the general EU structure is likely 
to lead to an extremely restrictive interpretation of this sovereignty reserve. Second, 
from the Court’s case law already in Commission v Council, air transit visas it would 
seem that, in an unspoken way, the ultimate judge of the comptens competenz is the 
Court itself, and therefore any reserve thereto is subject to its own control.52 Third, 
and in relation to the previous point, Article 276 TFEU reserve should be read in the 
light of the Court’s terrorist case law and the rule of law principle:53 if individual 
plaintiffs are not offered minimal procedural guarantees under the national legal 
system, then the EU legal order should step in – on the face of the express exclusion 
described above – in order to offer some judicial control, at least indirectly, in the 
form of a preliminary ruling. Such a requirement seems all the more compelling in 
view of the EU’s accession to the ECHR. Fourth, Member States whishing to stop 
some EU measure affecting their internal public order, are more likely to have 
recourse to the emergency brake clauses provided for in the Lisbon Treaty,54
 
 at the 
adoption level, rather than wait until such measures reach the Court. 
4.2. Urgency procedure 
 
The generalisation of the Court’s jurisdiction to cover all matters pertaining to the 
AFSJ will certainly lead to some (considerable?) increase of the Court’s workload. In 
particular, the extension of preliminary references to all jurisdictions of all Member 
States55 is likely to lead to greater delays in delivering preliminary rulings. Despite the 
successful efforts of the Court to limit the time necessary for delivering its judgments, 
the mean duration of a preliminary procedure before the Court was of 19,3 months in 
2007.56
In order to accommodate these procedural requirements with the need to avoid 
lengthy detention periods,
 Part of this delay is due to inelastic procedural requirements, linked to 
translation, to the time left to the Commission and the Member States in order to 
present their observations etc.  
57
                                                        
52 For this and further cases see below 4.2. 
53 See above 2.2.2 and 3.2. 
54 See above 3.3. 
55 See above 3.1. 
 the President of the ECJ has proposed to the Council a 
56 See the Court’s Annual Report (2007) available at 
http://curia.europa.eu/en/instit/presentationfr/index_cje.htm. 
57 In this respect the ongoing negotiations for the adoption of the ‘return’ directive are highly 
topical, on which a political agreement in the Council has only been reached after three years 
of negotiations, on May 5, 2008. 
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modification of the Court’s own statute, in order to introduce a fast-track ‘interim’ 
preliminary procedure specifically reserved to AFSJ issues.58 From the two solutions 
put forward by the President of the Court, the Council opted for the one most 
respectful of Member States’ rights (to the detriment of expediency and the rights of 
detainees). Council Decision 2008/79/EC59 modified the Court’s statute in order to 
shorten the duration of the written procedure.60 Therefore, only the Member State 
concerned and the Commission (and the Parliament and Council if one of their acts 
are at stake) are allowed to present written observations, while intervening parties 
may only present oral observations. The five-member chamber specially competent 
for this procedure shall deliver its judgment shortly after hearing the Advocate 
General, while the exchange of documents shall be based essentially on the use of 
electronic means. This procedure is already operational,61
 
 therefore, the last 
paragraph of Article 267 TFEU has no added value other than to offer a (not needed) 
constitutional grounding for it. 
4.3. CFSP acts 
 
The Court’s judgments in the ‘terrorist’ cases62
First, it is foreseen that the Court monitors the borderlines between CFSP and the 
other EU competences (see Article 40 TEU). This confirms and consolidates 
previous ECJ jurisprudence. At a time when the Court had no competence at all in 
the third pillar (i.e. before the entry into force of the Amsterdam Treaty, on May 
1999), held that it had jurisdiction to rule on the legality of a (third pillar) common 
action of the Council.
 have shown how closely intertwined 
the acts pertaining to the AFSJ (first and third pillars) and those stemming from the 
CFSP (second pillar) may be. In this respect a new provision introduced into the 
Lisbon Treaty does merit a word of comment.  
Article 275 TFEU specifically provides that the Court has no ‘jurisdiction with respect 
to the provisions relating to the CFSP nor with respect to acts adopted on the basis 
of these provisions’. This general rule, however, is subject to two exceptions 
enumerated in the second paragraph of this same provision. Both exceptions are 
highly relevant for the AFSJ.  
63 Such jurisdiction was necessary in order to protect that first 
pillar competences were not violated. The same solution, was later followed 
concerning the relationships between the second and third pillars. The recent cases 
concerning the imposition of ‘smart sanctions’ (in the form of the ‘freezing’ of assets) 
on persons, organizations etc allegedly connected to terrorism, offer a vocal 
illustration of the Court’s perception of the extent of its own jurisdiction. In this 
respect, the Court of First Instance (CFI) has delivered three series of important 
judgments64 and, on appeal,65 the Court another three. 66
                                                        
58 Document 13272/06 of September 28th, 2006. For a brief discussion of this document see 
the Editorial Comments in 44 CMLRev (2007) 1-7. 
59 Decision of the Council 2008/79/EC of 20 December 2007, amending the Protocol on the 
Statute of the Court of Justice, OJ [2008] L 24/42. 
60 See E. Bernard ‘La nouvelle procédure préjudicielle d’urgence applicable aux renvois 
relatifs à l’Espace de liberté, sécurité et de justice’ (5/2008) Europe, 5-8. 
 The factual background of 
61 See also the information and instructions provided by the Court’s webpage 
http://curia.europa.eu/en/instit/txtdocfr/txtsenvigueur/noteppu.pdf  
62 See among others the cases quoted above in fn 26 and 28.  
63 Case C-170/96 Commission  v Council, air transit visas [1998] ECR I-2763.  
64 Cases of the same date T-306/01 Yusuf  and Τ-315/01 Kadi, judgments of September 21, 
2005, for which see D. Simon & F. Mariatte, ‘ Le tribunal de première instance des 
Communautés : Professeur de droit international ? A propos des arrêts Yusuf et Kadi ’ (2005) 
Europe chron. 12, p. 6 and the case note by Ch Tomuschat in 43 CMLRev (2006) 537-
551; and Τ-253/02 Ayadi and Τ-49/04 Hassan, judgments of July 12, 2006, for which see D. 
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all five cases decided by the CFI is very similar.67
‘the Court of First Instance has jurisdiction to hear an action for annulment directed 
against a Common Position adopted on the basis of Articles 15 EU and 34 EU only 
strictly to the extent that, in support of such an action, the applicant alleges an 
infringement of the Community’s competences’.
 In order to implement several UN 
Security Council resolutions the Council of the EC has adopted several common 
positions based on the second (and occasionally) third pillar. On the basis of these 
common positions, and for their implementation, several first pillar regulations and 
decisions have been adopted. In all cases, the plaintiffs asked for the annulment of 
the totality of the above acts. The CFI started by explaining that common positions of 
either the second or third pillar are, in principle, outside its control. It went on, 
however, to state that  
68
This approach was taken further and expanded in the two extremely important 
judgments of the Court, in appeal proceedings against an Order of the President of 
the CFI.
 
69 In Gestoras pro Amnestia and Segi.70
 
  
The above judgments of the Court also explain the second reserve to the general 
rule of Article  275 TFEU, whereby the Court does have jurisdiction to hear 
annulment proceedings against CFSP ‘decisions providing for restrictive measures 
against natural or legal persons’. 
5. Conclusion 
 
It would be exaggerated to say that the Lisbon Treaty fundamentally innovates 
concerning the Court’s jurisdiction. The single most important novelty of the new 
Treaty, the abolition of the pillar structure, does, nonetheless, have important 
consequences for the Court’s role, especially in the AFSJ. Henceforth, the Court has 
full competence a) to deliver preliminary rulings (all jurisdictions of all Member States 
concerning all sources of EU law, both primary and secondary), b) to hear annulment 
proceedings introduced by individual plaintiffs against all acts of all the EU 
                                                                                                                                                              
Simon & F. Mariatte ‘ Le ‘droit’ à la protection diplomatique : droit fondamental en droit 
communautaire ? ’ (2006) Europe chron. 11 p. 4; See also case T-228/02 Mojahedines, 
judgment of December 12, 2006, for which see the case note by Ch Eckes in 44 CMLRev 
(2007) 117-129; all the above cases are currently under appeal before the ECJ. For a general 
assessment of the relevant case law see W Vlcek ‘Acts to Combat the Financing of Terrorism: 
Common Foreign and Security Policy at the ECJ’ 11 European Foreign Affairs Review (2006) 
491-507; also M Nettesheim ‘UN Sanctions against individuals – A challenge to the 
architecture of EU Governance’ 44 CMLRev (2007) 567-600; also P Stangos & G Gryllos ‘Le 
droit communautaire à l’épreuve des réalités du droit international: leçons tirées de la 
jurisprudence communautaire récente relevant de la lutte contre le terrorisme international’ 3-
4 CDE (2006) 429-481. 
65 For all five cases, appeals are currently pending before the ECJ; the three appeal 
judgments already delivered by the ECJ concern previous orders by the President of the CFI. 
66 Case C-229/05 Ocalan judgment of January 18, 2007; Case C-354/04 P Gestoras pro 
Amnestia and Case C-355/04 P, Segi, both delivered on February 27, 2007; for these two 
cases see E. Meisse in (4/2007) Europe comm. 110, p. 24-25. 
67 On similar facts and concerning the imposition of smart sanctions the CFI has actually 
delivered some more judgments and orders, of lesser importance, which are not discussed 
here; see for instance: Case (order) T-338/02 Segi e.a. [2004] ECR II-1647; Case (Order) T-
299/04 Selmani, judgment of November 18, 2005; Case T-362/04 Minin, judgment of January 
31, 2007. 
68Mojahedines para 56. On these judgments see A Miron ‘La jurisprudence du TPI à propos 
de l’inscription sur les listes terroristes’ 511 RMUE (2007) 526-531. 
69 Above n. 67. For these judgments see A Berramande ‘Les limites de la protection 
juridictionnelle dans le cadre du titre IV du traité sur l’UE’ 2 RDUE (2007) 433-446. 
70 See above fn 26. 
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Institutions and of other bodies, Agencies etc c) to judge on infringement proceedings 
against Member States and d) to hear claims for damages. By the same token, the 
hotly debated issue of EU competence to adopt criminal measures is emptied of any 
substance.71
                                                        
71 Dealt with by the judgments of the Court in Cases C-176/03 and C-77/05, above fn 
 All these are new competences in the field of the AFSJ. Most of these 
developments, however, have been anticipated or at least, put into the agenda, by 
the Court already under the current institutional setting.  
Most interestingly, the judgments that the Court delivered in the field of AFSJ during 
these years have had a clear spill-over effect: they have paved the way for a more 
general strengthening of the Court’s role in all other areas: the right of individual 
plaintiffs to initiate proceedings against acts of the European Council and of 
Agencies, bodies etc, and this without (always) having to prove individual concern, 
are requirements stemming from the strong ‘rule of law’ approach put forward by the 
Court in the AFSJ. 
In its judgments in Pupino, the terrorist cases and the other cases discussed above, 
the Court recognises supra-constitutional status to some basic principles, strictly 
connected to the respect of individual rights. Such rights are not, according to the 
Court, modifiable at the free will of the Member States, but remain beyond their 
grasp. Such principles are inherent to the construction of any legal order having as its 
subjects (also) individuals and not only States. However, the accession of the EU to 
the ECHR requires these principles to be spelled out and to have a clearer scope. 
This is the essential input of the Lisbon Treaty in relation to the AFSJ. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4; see 
in this respect H Labayle ‘L’ouverture de la jarre de Pandore, Réflexions sur la competence 
de la Communauté en matière pénale’ 3-4 CDE (2006) 379-428; and on a more critical tone, 
A Dawes & O Lynskey ‘The Ever-longer of EC law: The Extension of Community Competence 
into the Field of Criminal Law 45 CMLRev (2008) 131-158. 
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